
2025 was the year venture capital finally acknowledged that the old playbook wasn’t returning. Investors stopped backing vague visions and instead focused on companies with clear, structural demand, such as AI infrastructure, security tooling, and core financial rails. In contrast, startups with slow hardware adoption, heavy compliance risk, or unstable consumer demand often faltered. That divide defined the year’s biggest outcomes: a few ventures delivered real valuation gains and liquidity, while several formerly hyped names reached bankruptcy, proving once again that raising capital isn’t the same as building a durable business.
This recap highlights venture-backed companies where 2025 produced a clear “scoreboard”, meaningful up-rounds and IPOs on the positive side and bankruptcies or forced restructurings on the negative side. Here, “best” refers to validated valuation increases or liquidity events, and “worst” refers to investment cases that broke down due to insolvency, compliance failures, or unworkable economics.
Best Startup Venture Investments of 2025
The strongest outcomes of 2025 had one thing in common: they were built on real, long-term demand, not trends. AI compute, security, and financial infrastructure all fit that description. These companies did more than raise capital, they saw valuation bumps or created liquidity that rewarded early investors.
OpenAI represented the defining investment of 2025. In March, the company closed a $40 billion funding round led by SoftBank with participation from other heavyweight investors, valuing it at roughly $300 billion, a record private tech financing. By year-end, secondary trading data and investor discussions indicated OpenAI’s valuation was trending meaningfully above the price of this round. The deal underlined how essential AI compute and foundational models have become in technology ecosystems: capital itself can act as a strategic moat in platform transitions.
CoreWeave became one of the few deep AI infrastructure companies to reach public markets in 2025. Its shares closed above the IPO price in early trading, demonstrating that public investors were willing to pay a premium for scaled AI compute backed by real contracts. Although market conditions remain volatile for capital-intensive businesses, CoreWeave provided one of the year’s few notable liquidity events for venture investors, turning AI compute bottlenecks into both revenue and tradable equity.
Circle’s NYSE debut was a major sentiment shift for crypto-adjacent fintech. The company priced its IPO at $31 per share and raised about $1.05 billion, with its stock opening sharply higher as investors embraced a regulated, payment-infrastructure model rather than speculative crypto products. This wasn’t just a valuation story, the market rewarded Circle’s financial rails and stablecoin usage anchored in real payment flows.
Cyera’s funding rounds in 2025 illustrated where AI spending made economic sense: security and data governance. The company raised $540 million in a Series E round, which doubled its valuation to around $6 billion as it became a critical layer for enterprises deploying AI securely. The rapid sequential valuation increases signaled sustained budget urgency around data protection and compliance in AI environments.
In a tough year for fintech, Airwallex stood out by raising $300 million at a $6.2 billion valuation. This rare valuation lift reflected ongoing investor interest in B2B payment infrastructure, particularly cross-border rails with solid unit economics and enterprise demand, even as consumer fintech struggled.
Where the winners were anchored in structural demand, the failures were marked by fragility: heavy burn rates, complex hardware deployments, regulatory exposure, or economic models that only worked in a loose capital market.
Solid, a banking-as-a-service provider once touted as a fintech infrastructure play, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy after raising nearly $81 million. The collapse highlighted that in regulated fintech, trust and compliance are foundational, once partner banks, regulators, or investors lose confidence, infrastructure models can unravel quickly.
Ample, an EV battery-swapping infrastructure startup, also moved into Chapter 11 after raising hundreds of millions. While the concept of rapid battery swaps had intuitive appeal, the company struggled to translate that into economic viability at scale. High infrastructure costs and slow utilization growth in the tightening capital environment left it without runway and forced restructuring, underscoring the risks of capital-intensive hardware bets without clear utilization thresholds.
According to GeekWire, the Seattle‑based company reported revenues falling from about $129.8 million in 2023 to approximately $63.3 million so far in 2025, and liabilities of nearly $73 million against assets of about $32 million in its bankruptcy filing. The company had previously raised more than $300 million from investors and reached a valuation of $1.65 billion during the pandemic‑era boom. With physical goods businesses, inventory carrying costs, returns, tariffs, and service obligations can quickly overwhelm the balance sheet when demand drops, unlike software‑driven models such as SaaS where operating costs scale differently.
Linqto’s bankruptcy in July 2025 highlighted how regulatory and compliance failures can destroy a fintech marketplace platform, even if the product appears promising. The company, which let investors access private‑market securities, filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy after facing investigations by the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) over alleged securities‑law violations and structural problems with how it operated. Once regulatory trust faltered and scrutiny intensified, Linqto’s core business model unraveled, leading to insolvency. This case serves as a stark reminder that in regulated financial markets, compliance risk can be existential rather than a peripheral issue.
The 2025 scoreboard points to a few lessons that are uncomfortable precisely because they’re practical.
First, the market is rewarding leverage, not hype. OpenAI, CoreWeave, Circle, Cyera, and Airwallex all sit at critical choke points in their ecosystems; compute, financial rails, security, or widely adopted infrastructure. These companies don’t need mass consumer love; they need a focused set of high-value customers (enterprises, developers, financial institutions) who keep buying because switching is costly or risky. For founders, the takeaway is a product design challenge: build something that becomes more essential the longer it’s used, not through gimmicky lock-in, but because customers rely on it to operate.
Second, capital intensity isn’t inherently bad, but it is a strategic choice, and it requires disciplined financing. CoreWeave is capital-intensive but backed by contracted demand. Ample was capital-intensive without a clear utilization path. That distinction is decisive. If your business depends on physical deployment or heavy infrastructure, financing becomes part of product-market fit. The relevant question isn’t just “does this work?” but “can it reach breakeven utilization before the funding window closes?” Investors need to price capital intensity honestly. A company that only survives if capital markets remain perfect for five years isn’t executing a growth plan; it’s betting on macro conditions.
Third, in fintech, especially BaaS and private-market platforms, trust and compliance are the product. Solid and Linqto show how one compliance failure can erase years of product execution because the business depends on partners, regulators, and credibility. Founders should invest early in scalable controls: auditability, transparent fund flows, clean legal structures, and conservative representations. Investors need diligence that goes beyond metrics dashboards, governance, risk processes, partner contracts, and a “what could shut this down tomorrow?” review deserve as much scrutiny as CAC or revenue growth.
Fourth, consumer physical goods companies don’t fail like SaaS, they fail like balance sheets. Rad Power is a familiar pattern: a demand spike leads to inventory bets, those bets turn into cash traps, and the company can’t climb out because markets no longer fund “repair the balance sheet” rounds. Founders in hardware or durable goods should design for volatility: tighter SKU discipline, strong service and recall reserves, and supply chains that don’t assume perfect freight costs forever. Investors should stop benchmarking these companies like software. The important questions are working-capital needs, return and warranty exposure, and whether the company can downshift without breaking.
Finally, 2025 underscored a quiet truth about top-performing venture investments: sometimes the win is simply getting liquidity while others can’t. Circle’s IPO wasn’t just a valuation moment, it signaled that exits can reopen in pockets, and companies that are operationally legible to public investors (clean revenue, strong regulatory posture, clear narrative) capture outsized gains. Founders who want that option should build for public-market readability early. Investors should help companies become explainable, not merely exciting, because explainable is what unlocks liquidity.